Nation and State: an article in the style of St Thomas Aquinas

Deinde considerandum est de divisione inter gentem (vel nationem) et civitatem secundum beatum Thomam de Aquino. Circa hoc quaeritur: utrum gens vel natio est causa materialis communitatis politicae?	We must now consider the division between nation and state according to St Thomas Aquinas. Under this heading it is asked: whether the nation is the material cause of the political community?
Et sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatus Thomas haud dividit gentem ex civitate tamquam causa ex effectu, immo non dividit essentialiter gentem ex civitate. Quia dicitur (1a 2ae q.95 a.4) quod ius positivum dividitur in ius gentium et ius civile, id est ius civitatis. Sed ius gentium non definit ut ius proprium singularum gentium vel nationum; sed ius quod “omnes fere gentes utuntur” (ibid., obj. 1; cf. Isid. Etym. 5.6; Grat. Decr. D.1 c.9). Patet enim quia, secundum beatum Thomam et Isidorum et Gratianum quoque, ius gentium est ius quasi universale servatum in universo orbi terrarum. Atqui gens (vel natio) non est aliquid universale, sed distinguitur gens una ex gente altera sicut unus homo ex altero. Ergo divisio gentis ex civitate non congruit divisioni iuris gentium ex iure civili secundum beatum Thomam.	Objection 1: It would seem that St Thomas does not at all divide nation from state as cause from effect, nor does he even make any essential division of nation from state. For it is said (1a 2ae q.95 a.4) that positive law is divided into law of nations and civil law, that is, the law of a state. But he does not define the law of nations as a law which belongs to individual nations; but as the law which “nearly all nations use” (ibid., obj. 1; cf. Isid. Etym. 5.6; Grat. Decr. D.1 c.9). For it is evident that, according to St Thomas and Isidore and Gratian as well, the law of nations is a sort of universal law observed all over the world. A nation, however, is not something universal, but one nation is distinct from another nation just as one man is distinct from another. Therefore, according to St Thomas Aquinas, the distinction between nation and state does not correspond to the distinction between law of nations and civil law.
Praeterea, si gens vel natio esset distincta essentialiter ex civitate, ius gentium esset ius non factum a civitatibus, sed gentibus. Sed in D.1 c.9 Isidorus dicit: “Ius gentium est sedium occupatio, edificatio, munitio, bella, captivitates, servitutes, postliminia, federa pacis, induciae, legatorum non violandorum religio, conubia inter alienigenas prohibita” (Isid. Etym. 5.6). Sed federa et induciae fiunt a civitatibus, vel proprie ab civitatis auctoritatibus pro civitate. Inde ius gentium, quod haec civilia continet, est ius a civitatibus factum. Ergo gens non dividitur essentialiter ex civitate apud beatum Thomam, quoniam beatus Thomas, Isidorum secutus, verbum gentes utitur pro civitatibus.	Objection 2: Moreover, if the nation was essentially distinct from the state, the law of nations would be a law made not by states but by nations. But in D.1 c.9 (trans. Thompson and Gordley) Isidore says: “The law of nations deals with occupation of habitations, with building, fortification, war, captivity, servitude, postliminy, treaties, armistices, truces, the obligation of not harming ambassadors, and the prohibition of marriage with aliens” (Isid. Etym. 5.6). But treaties and armistices are made by states, or more properly by governing authorities on behalf of a state. Hence the law of nations, which deals with these matters of state, is a law made by states. Therefore nation is not essentially divided from state in St Thomas, since St Thomas, following Isidore, uses the word ‘nations’ for ‘states.’
Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Abrahae in libro Genes. (12:2): Faciamque te in gentem magnam.	On the contrary, the Lord says to Abraham in Genesis (12:2): And I will make of thee a great nation.
Respondeo dicendum quod, communitas politica vel civitas habet quattuor causas, scilicet causam efficientem formalem finalem et materialem.	I answer that, the political community or state has four causes, namely an efficient, formal, final, and material cause.
Unde causa efficiens civitatis est auctoritas: aut delegatio vel acceptio auctoritatis a populo, aut tributio auctoritatis a Deo, aut alius actus conferens vel praeponens vel designans unum agentem auctoritatem populo.	And so the efficient cause of the state is an authority: either the delegation or acceptance of an authority by the people, or the assignment of authority by God, or some other action conferring or setting up or marking out one agent as the authority for a people.
Causa formalis civitatis est regimen: ut beatus Thomas dicit (1a 2ae q.95 a.4), Aristotelem secutus, sunt “diversa regimina civitatum,” scilicet regnum, aristocratia regimen, populi regimen.	The formal cause of the state is the regime: as St Thomas says (1a 2ae q.95 a.4), following Aristotle, there are “various forms of government,” namely monarchy, aristocracy, democracy.
Causa finalis civitatis est cooperatio multorum hominum ad persequendum bonum commune vel bona coniunctim. Ergo, causa efficiens civitatis dicitur alio modo consensus populi ad persequendum bonum commune sub aliqua auctoritate.	The final cause of the state is the cooperation of many men in the pursuit of a common good or of several good things together. Therefore, the efficient cause of the state is, to speak in another way, the agreement of a people to pursue the common good under a certain authority.
Causa materialis civitatis est gens vel natio, sed non exclusive. Possunt enim coniungi aliae hominum congregationes in regimine sub auctoritate ad persequendum bonum commune tamquam civitas; ut urbs, regnum, imperium sunt varia civitatis genera, etenim ecclesia est quasi civitas vel communitas politica. Unde gens vel natio est civitatis una possibilis materia, sed non excluditur alia materia; et omnis materia civitatis comprehenditur in verbo ‘populus,’ ut habet beatus Thomas (1a 2ae q.105 a.3) cum dicit: “si statim extranei advenientes reciperentur ad tractandum ea quae sunt populi, possent multa pericula contingere; dum extranei, non habentes adhuc amorem firmatum ad bonum publicum, aliqua contra populum attentarent.” Ergo causa materialis civitatis proprie est populus.	The material cause of the state is the nation, but not exclusively. For other kinds of social group can be joined together into a regime under an authority to pursue a common good as a state; for instance a city, a realm, and an empire are different kinds of state, and indeed the Church is a sort of state or political community. Hence a nation is one possible matter of a state, but other matter is not excluded; and every kind of matter for a state is included in the term ‘a people,’ as Thomas has it (1a 2ae q.105 a.3) when he says: “if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt something hurtful to the people.” Therefore the material cause of the state is properly the people.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ius gentium olim, apud Romanos, significabat ius a praetoribus applicandum ad gentes subditos civitatis vel imperii Romani (Gilby, p. 110–11). Exinde recepit significationem iuris quod omnes fere gentes utuntur; sed non necesse est excludere significationem veterem, quae refert distinctionem inter gentem et civitatem, sicut civitas Romana superabat gentes multas.	Reply to Objection 1: The ‘law of nations’ formerly meant, among the Romans, the law which the praetors used in governing the subject nations of the Roman state or empire (Gilby, p. 110–11). From there it later received the meaning of ‘the law which nearly all nations use’; but it is not necessary to exclude the old meaning, which does indicate the distinction between nation and state, for the Roman state subdued many nations.
Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc loco Isidorus loquitur indistincte de institutis gentium vel civitatum, quoniam distinctio non pertinet ad intellectum iuris gentium in dicendi modo moderno. Sed patet ex illo Genes., Faciamque te in gentem magnam, quod gens non identificanda est cum civitate, quoniam civitas Iudaeorum, scilicet regnum, periit, sed non periit gens Abrahae, scilicet Iudaei; nec peribit usque mundi consummationem.	Reply to Objection 2: In this passage Isidore is speaking indistinctly about things established either by nations or by states, since this distinction is not relevant to understanding the law of nations in the modern sense of the term. But it is evident from that passage of Genesis, And I will make of thee a great nation, that the nation is not to be identified with the state, since the Jews’ state, namely the Kingdom, perished, but Abraham’s nation, namely the Jews, did not perish; nor will it perish until the end of the world.